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Abstract The paper deals with bonus–malus systems with different claim types and varying
deductibles. The premium relativities are softened for the policyholders who are in the malus
zone and these policyholders are subject to per claim deductibles depending on their levels in
the bonus–malus scale and the types of the reported claims. We introduce such bonus–malus
systems and study their basic properties. In particular, we investigate when it is possible to
introduce varying deductibles, what restrictions we have and how we can do this. Moreover,
we deal with the special case where varying deductibles are applied to the claims reported by
policyholders occupying the highest level in the bonus–malus scale and consider two allocation
principles for the deductibles. Finally, numerical illustrations are presented.
Keywords Bonus–malus system, claim type, varying deductible, indifference principle,
allocation principle, premium relativity, Markov chain, transition matrix, stationary
distribution
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1 Introduction and motivation
One of the main tasks of an actuary is to design a tariff structure that fairly distributes
the total risk of potential losses among policyholders. To this end, he often has to
grade all policyholders into risk classes such that all policyholders belonging to the
same class pay the same premium. Rating systems penalizing policyholders respon-
sible for one or more accidents by premium surcharges (or maluses), and rewarding
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by VTeX. Open access article under the CC BY license.
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claim-free policyholders by giving them discounts (or bonuses) are now in force in
many developed countries. Such systems, which are often called bonus–malus sys-
tems, aim to assess individual risks better.
The amount of premium is adjusted each year on the basis of the individual claims
experience. In practice, a bonus–malus scale consists of a finite number of levels and
each of the levels has its own relative premium. After each year, the policyholder
moves up or down according to the transition rules and the number of claims reported
during the current year. Thus, bonus–malus systems also encourage policyholders
to be careful. Note that the premium relativities are traditionally computed using a
quadratic loss function. This method is proposed by Norberg in his pioneering work
[14] on segmented tariffs. Alternatively, Denuit and Dhaene [2] use an exponential
loss function to compute the relativities.
In most of the commercial bonus–malus systems used by insurance companies,
knowing the current level and the number of claims during the current period suffices
to determine the next level in the scale. Therefore, the future level depends only on
the present and not on the past. The numbers of claims in different years are usually
assumed to be independent. So the trajectory of each policyholder in the bonus–malus
scale can be considered as a Markov chain. For details and more information concern-
ing bonus–malus systems, we refer the reader to [3, 10, 19]. In particular, [3] presents
a comprehensive treatment of the various experience rating systems and their rela-
tionships with risk classification.
As pointed out by many authors, traditional bonus–malus systems suffer from two
considerable drawbacks:
(i) The claim amounts are not taken into account. So a posteriori corrections de-
pend only on the number of claims. In this case, policyholders who had ac-
cidents with small or large claims are penalized unfairly in the same way. In
particular, this breeds bonus hunger when policyholders cover small claims
themselves in order to avoid future premium increases.
(ii) At any time the policyholders may leave the insurance company without any
further financial penalties. Thus, bonus–malus systems create the possibility
of malus evasion, i.e. the situation when the policyholders leave the insurance
company to avoid premium increase because of reported claims.
An alternative approach, which, at least theoretically, eliminates the second draw-
back, is proposed by Holtan [9]. He suggests the use of very high deductibles that may
be borrowed by the policyholders in the insurance company. The deductibles are as-
sumed to be constant for all policyholders, i.e. independent of the level they occupy
in the bonus–malus system at the time of claim occurrence. Although technically ac-
ceptable, this approach obviously causes considerable practical problems. Practical
consequences of Holtan’s proposal are investigated by Lemaire and Zi [11]. Particu-
larly, it is shown that the introduction of high deductibles increases the variability of
payments and the efficiency of the rating systems for most policyholders.
Bonus–malus systems with varying deductibles are introduced by Pitrebois, De-
nuit andWalhin [17]. Specifically, the a posteriori premium correction induced by the
bonus–malus system is replaced by a deductible (in whole or in part). To each level of
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the bonus–malus system in the malus zone is assigned an amount of deductible, which
is applied to the claims filed during the coverage period either annually or claim by
claim. Relative premiums at high levels of bonus–malus systems are often very large
and the systems can be softened by introducing deductibles. The insurance company
compensates the reduced penalties in the malus zone with the deductibles paid by
policyholders who report claims being in the malus zone. This can be commercially
attractive since the policyholders are penalized only if they report claims in the future.
As pointed out in [17], combining bonus–malus systems with varying deductibles
presents a number of advantages. Firstly, the policyholders will do all their best to
prevent or at least decrease the losses. Secondly, even if the policyholder leaves the
company after a claim, he has to pay for the deductible. Thirdly, relative premiums
and amounts of deductibles may be tuned in an optimal way in order to attract the
policyholders. The numerical illustrations show that the mixed case (reduced relative
premiums combined with per claim deductibles) gives the best results. The amounts
of deductibles are moderate in this case. Nevertheless, this approach does not elimi-
nate the first drawback mentioned above.
To eliminate the first drawback, a few other approaches have been proposed.
Bonus–malus systems involving different claim types are designed in [18]. Each
claim type induces a specific penalty for the policyholder. In particular, claim amounts
can be taken into account in this way. For some early results in this direction, see also
[10, 15, 16].
The next approach is based on a generalization of results obtained by Dionne
and Vanasse [4, 5], who propose a bonus–malus system that integrates a priori and a
posteriori information on an individual basis. Specifically, the system is derived as a
function of the years that the policyholder is in the portfolio, the number of claims and
his individual characteristics. Frangos and Vrontos [6] expand the frame developed
in [4, 5] and propose a generalized bonus–malus system that takes into consideration
simultaneously the policyholder’s characteristics, the number of his claims and the
exact amount of each claim. Particularly, it is assumed that we have all information
about the claim frequency history and the claim amount history for each policyholder
for the time period he is in the portfolio. In this generalized bonus–malus system, the
premium is a function of the years that the policyholder is in the portfolio, his num-
ber of claims, the amount of each claim and the significant a priori rating variables.
Therefore, the future premium depends on the past (all policyholder’s history) and is
actually calculated individually for each policyholder. This approach is extended and
developed in [12, 13, 20].
Another approach that takes into account claim amounts is proposed by Bonsdorff
[1]. The author considers a general framework for a bonus–malus system based on the
number of claims during the previous year and the total amount of claims during the
previous year. The set of the bonus levels is some interval and the transitions between
the levels are determined by these characteristics.
Gómez-Déniz, Hernández-Bastida and Fernández-Sánchez [8] obtain expressions
that can be used to compute bonus–malus premiums based on the distribution of the
total claim amount but not on the claims which produce the amounts.
Another modification of traditional bonus–malus systems, which take into ac-
count only the number of claims, is considered by Gómez-Déniz in the recent paper
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[7]. The author presents a statistical model, which distinguishes between two dif-
ferent claim types, incorporating a bivariate distribution based on the assumption of
dependence.
The present paper deals with the case where both penalty types are used for the
policyholderswho are in the malus zone. Specifically, the premium relativities, which
are computed using a quadratic loss function, are softened and the policyholders who
are in the malus zone are subject to per claim deductibles. The mixed bonus–malus
system combining premium relativities and deductibles is expected to be the most
relevant in practice (see [3, 17]).
We try to eliminate both drawbacks mentioned above. To take into account claim
amounts, we consider different claim types and use the multi-event bonus–malus sys-
tems introduced in [18]. To eliminate the second drawback, we introduce varying
deductibles for the policyholders who are in the malus zone. The deductibles depend
on the level of the policyholder in the bonus–malus scale and the types of the reported
claims. Such bonus–malus systems present a number of advantages and seem to be
very attractive for policyholders. Namely, policyholders reporting small and large
claims are not penalized in the same way. This helps to avoid or at least decrease
bonus hunger. Moreover, all advantages mentioned in [17] are also in force.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the multi-
event bonus–malus systems introduced in [18]. In Section 3, we introduce varying
deductibles in such bonus–malus systems and study basic properties of such systems.
In particular, we investigate when it is possible to introduce varying deductibles in
the bonus–malus systems with different claim types, what restrictions we have and
how we can do this. Section 4 deals with the special case where varying deductibles
are applied to the claims reported by policyholders occupying the highest level in the
bonus–malus scale. We consider two allocation principles for the deductibles, which
seems to be natural and fair for policyholders. In Section 5, we consider an example
of such a bonus–malus system, deal with exponentially distributed claim sizes and
present numerical illustrations. Section 6 completes the paper.
2 Bonus–malus systems with different claim types
To take into consideration different claim types, we use the multi-event bonus–malus
systems introduced in [18] (see also [3]).
Let us pick a policyholder at random from the portfolio and denote by N the
number of claims reported by the policyholder during the year. In what follows, we
assume that there is no a priori risk classification (or we work inside a specified rating
cell). Denote by λ > 0 the a priori annual expected claim frequency. Let Θ be the
(unknown) accident proneness of this policyholder, i.e. Θ represents the residual ef-
fect of unobserved characteristics. The risk profile of the portfolio is described by the
distribution functionFΘ ofΘ. It is usually assumed that P[Θ ≥ 0] = 1 andE[Θ] = 1.
Thus, the actual (unknown) annual claim frequency of this policyholder is λΘ.
We assume that the number of claimsN is mixed-Poisson distributed. To be more
precise, the conditional probability mass function ofN is given by
P[N = j |Θ = θ] =
(λθ)j
j!
e−λθ, j ≥ 0.
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Hence, the unconditional probability mass function of N is given by
P[N = j] =
∫ +∞
0
P[N = j |Θ = θ] dFΘ(θ), j ≥ 0.
We introducem+1 different claim types reported by the policyholder. Each claim
type induces a specific penalty for the policyholder, which will be described below.
The type of the given claim is determined by the claim amount C. We assume that
all claim amounts are independent and identically distributed, and claim amounts and
claim frequencies are mutually independent. The claims are classified according to a
multinomial scheme. Let 0 < c∗1 < c
∗
2 < · · · < c
∗
m < ∞. We choose these numbers
so that all claims of size less than or equal to c∗1 are considered as claims of type 0,
all claims of size from the interval (c∗1, c
∗
2] are considered as claims of type 1 and so
on; finally, all claims of size greater than c∗m are considered as claims of typem. Let
q0 = P
[
C ≤ c∗1
]
, q1 = P
[
c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
,
q2 = P
[
c∗2 < C ≤ c
∗
3
]
, . . . , qm = P
[
C > c∗m
]
.
Thus, each time a claim is reported, it is classified in one of the m + 1 possible
categories with probabilities q0, q1, . . ., qm. It is clear that
∑m
i=0 qi = 1. Moreover, it
is natural to choose the c∗i so that all qi are strictly positive.
Denote by Ni the number of claims of type i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m. Therefore, for a
given Θ, the random variables N0, N1, . . ., Nm are mutually independent and the
corresponding conditional probability mass function is given by
P[Ni = j |Θ = θ] =
(λθqi)
j
j!
e−λθqi , j ≥ 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ m. (1)
The bonus–malus scale is assumed to have s + 1 levels numbered from 0 to s.
A higher level number indicates a higher premium. In particular, the policyholders
who are at level 0 enjoy the maximal bonus. A specified level is assigned to a new
policyholder. Each claim-free year is rewarded by a bonus point, i.e. the policyholder
goes one level down. Each claim type entails a specific penalty expressed as a fixed
number of levels per claim. It is natural to assume that larger claims entail more severe
penalties.
We suppose that knowing the present level and the number of claims of each type
filed during the present year suffices to determine the level to which the policyholder
is transferred. So the bonus–malus system may be represented by a Markov chain.
Let pl0l(λθ;q) be the probability of moving from level l0 to level l for a pol-
icyholder with annual mean claim frequency λθ and vector of probabilities q =
(q0, q1, . . . , qm)
T , where 0 ≤ l0 ≤ s, 0 ≤ l ≤ s and qi is the probability that
the claim is of type i. Denote by P (λθ;q) the one-step transition matrix, i.e.
P (λθ;q) =


p00(λθ;q) p01(λθ;q) . . . p0s(λθ;q)
p10(λθ;q) p11(λθ;q) . . . p1s(λθ;q)
...
...
. . .
...
ps0(λθ;q) ps1(λθ;q) . . . pss(λθ;q)

 .
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Taking the nth power of P (λθ;q) yields the n-step transition matrix with ele-
ments p
(n)
l0l
(λθ;q). Here p
(n)
l0l
(λθ;q) is the probability of moving from level l0 to
level l in n transitions.
The transition matrix P (λθ;q) is assumed to be regular, i.e. there is some inte-
ger n0 ≥ 1 such that all entries of P ((λθ;q))
n0 are strictly positive. Consequently,
the Markov chain describing the trajectory of a policyholder with expected claim fre-
quency λθ and vector of probabilities q is ergodic and thus possesses a stationary
distribution
pi(λθ;q) =
(
pi0(λθ;q), pi1(λθ;q), . . . , pis(λθ;q)
)T
.
Here pil(λθ;q) is the stationary probability for a policyholderwith annual mean claim
frequency λθ to be at level l, i.e.
pil(λθ;q) = lim
n→∞
p
(n)
l0l
(λθ;q).
The stationary probabilities pil(λθ;q) can be obtained directly (see [3, 19]). In-
deed, since the matrix P (λθ;q) is regular, the matrix I − P (λθ;q) + E is invertible
and pi(λθ;q) is given by
pi
T (λθ;q) = eT
(
I − P (λθ;q) + E
)
−1
, (2)
where e is a column vector of 1s, E is an (s+1)× (s+1)matrix consisting of s+1
column vectors e and I is an (s+ 1)× (s+ 1) identity matrix.
Next, let L be the level occupied in the scale by a randomly selected policyholder
and pil be the proportion of policyholders at level l once the steady state has been
reached. Then
pil = P[L = l] =
∫ +∞
0
pil(λθ;q) dFΘ(θ), 0 ≤ l ≤ s. (3)
It is easily seen that
∑s
l=0 pil = 1.
We denote by rl the premium relativities associated with level l. The meaning
is that a policyholder occupying level l pays the premium equal to λrlE[C]. Note
that here and below we consider only net premiums. In what follows, we assume that
E[C] <∞ and the distribution function FC of C is continuous.
To compute the premium relativities rl, we use a quadratic loss function as pro-
posed in [14] (see also [3, 10]). To this end, we minimize the expected squared dif-
ference between the "true" relative premium Θ and the relative premium rL applica-
ble to this policyholder after the stationary state has been reached, i.e. we minimize
E[(Θ − rL)
2]. The solution to this problem is given by
rl =
∫ +∞
0
θpil(λθ;q) dFΘ(θ)∫ +∞
0
pil(λθ;q) dFΘ(θ)
(4)
(see, e.g., [3, pp. 185–186] for the details).
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3 Varying deductibles in the bonus–malus systems with different claim types
The policyholder occupying level l in the bonus–malus systems described in Section 2
should pay λrlE[C]. We suppose that the relative premiums of the policyholders who
are in the bonus zone, i.e. with rl ≤ 1, are unchanged. So they pay premiums equal
to λrlE[C] and are subject to no further penalties. Let s0 = min{l : rl > 1}. The
relative premiums of the policyholders who are in the malus zone, i.e. with rl > 1,
or equivalently occupying level l such that s0 ≤ l ≤ s, are softened in the following
way. Instead of paying the premium equal to λrlE[C], the policyholder who is at
level l pays a reduced premium equal to (1 − αl)λrlE[C] for some specified αl ≥ 0
depending on level l. We suppose that αl satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1. 1 ≤ (1− αs0)rs0 ≤ (1− αs0+1)rs0+1 ≤ · · · ≤ (1− αs)rs.
Note that Assumption 1 implies that the policyholder occupying a higher level
in the bonus–malus scale pays a higher reduced premium, which is not less than the
basic premium λE[C]. Moreover, from Assumption 1 we have 0 ≤ αl ≤ 1 − 1/rl
for all l such that s0 ≤ l ≤ s. The case αl = 0 corresponds to the situation when
the policyholder occupying level l pays premium equal to λrlE[C] and is subject to
no further penalties. If αl = 1 − 1/rl, then the policyholder pays only the basic
premium λE[C] and has to pay something for claims in the future. To compensate
the reduced premium, the policyholder is subject to per claim deductible, i.e. applied
to each reported claim separately, equal to dl,i depending on level l occupied in the
malus zone and claim type i. We impose the following natural restrictions on dl,i.
Assumption 2. (i) For all l such that s0 ≤ l ≤ s, we have
0≤ dl,0≤ c
∗
1, 0≤ dl,1≤ c
∗
1, 0≤ dl,2≤ c
∗
2, . . . , 0≤ dl,m≤ c
∗
m.
(ii) For every fixed l such that s0 ≤ l ≤ s, we have
dl,0 ≤ dl,1 ≤ · · · ≤ dl,m.
(iii) For every fixed i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
ds0,i ≤ ds0+1,i ≤ · · · ≤ ds,i.
Assertion (i) of Assumption 2 means that if a claim reported is of type i, where
0 ≤ i ≤ m, then the deductible applied to it is strictly less than the claim amount,
i.e. the insurance company covers at least some part of the losses. Next, assertion (ii)
implies that larger claims are subject to higher deductibles. Finally, assertion (iii)
means that the higher level in the bonus–malus scale implies a higher deductible for
each specified claim amount.
For policyholders occupying level l, the deductibles dl,0, dl,1, . . ., dl,m are found
using the indifference principle (see [3, 17]): for this group of policyholders, the part
αl of the penalties induced by the bonus–malus system is on average equal to the total
amount of deductibles paid by these policyholders. Thus, the indifference principle
for the policyholder occupying level l can be written in the following way:
λrlE[C] = (1 − αl)λrlE[C] + λrl
(
E[C |C ≤ dl,0]P[C ≤ dl,0]
+ dl,0 P
[
dl,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
+ dl,1 P
[
c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
+ . . .
+ dl,m P
[
C > c∗m
])
, s0 ≤ l ≤ s. (5)
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On the left-hand side of (5), we have the premium paid by the policyholder oc-
cupying level l in the bonus–malus system described in Section 2. On the right-hand
side of (5), we have the expected amount paid by this policyholder in the bonus–malus
system with varying deductibles. This amount consists of the reduced premium and
the expected amount of penalties induced by deductibles.
Equation (5) can be rewritten as
αlE[C] = E[C |C ≤ dl,0]P[C ≤ dl,0] + dl,0 P
[
dl,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
+ dl,1 P
[
c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
+ · · ·+ dl,m P
[
C > c∗m
]
, s0 ≤ l ≤ s,
which is equivalent to
αlE[C] = E[C |C ≤ dl,0]P[C ≤ dl,0] + dl,0
(
q0 − P[C ≤ dl,0]
)
+ dl,1q1 + · · ·+ dl,mqm, s0 ≤ l ≤ s.
(6)
Thus, in order to introduce varying deductibles in the bonus–malus system, we
have to choose αl, dl,0, dl,1, . . ., dl,m satisfying (6) and Assumptions 1 and 2 for all l
such that s0 ≤ l ≤ s. In what follows, we call any such combination of αl, dl,0, dl,1,
. . ., dl,m, where s0 ≤ l ≤ s, by a solution to (6).
Lemma 1. The right-hand side of (6) is a non-decreasing function of each of the
variables dl,0, dl,1, . . ., dl,m.
Proof. The assertion of Lemma 1 is evident for variables dl,1, . . ., dl,m. We now
show it for dl,0. Let 0 ≤ d
′
l,0 ≤ d
′′
l,0 ≤ c
∗
1. Then we get
E
[
C |C ≤ d′′l,0
]
P
[
C ≤ d′′l,0
]
+ d′′l,0 P
[
d′′l,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
− E
[
C |C ≤ d′l,0
]
P
[
C ≤ d′l,0
]
− d′l,0 P
[
d′l,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
≥
E[C |C ≤ d′l,0]P[C ≤ d
′
l,0] + d
′
l,0 P[d
′
l,0 < C ≤ d
′′
l,0]
P[C ≤ d′′l,0]
P
[
C ≤ d′′l,0
]
+ d′′l,0 P
[
d′′l,0 <C ≤ c
∗
1
]
− E
[
C |C ≤ d′l,0
]
P
[
C ≤ d′l,0
]
− d′l,0 P
[
d′l,0<C ≤ c
∗
1
]
= d′l,0 P
[
d′l,0 < C ≤ d
′′
l,0
]
+ d′′l,0 P
[
d′′l,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
− d′l,0 P
[
d′l,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
=
(
d′′l,0 − d
′
l,0
)
P
[
d′′l,0 < C ≤ c
∗
1
]
≥ 0,
which proves the lemma.
In addition, taking into account the continuity of FC gives that the right-hand side
of (6) is continuous in dl,0, dl,1, . . ., dl,m.
Proposition 1. For any fixed αl satisfying Assumption 1, we have
dl,m ≤ min
{
αlE[C]/qm, c
∗
m
}
, s0 ≤ l ≤ s. (7)
Proof. From Lemma 1, we conclude that for any fixed αl, the maximum possi-
ble value of dl,m is when dl,0 = dl,1 = · · · = dl,m−1 = 0. Therefore, dl,m ≤
αlE[C]/qm. Taking into account assertion (i) of Assumption 2 yields (7).
Proposition 2. If l1 and l2 are such that s0 ≤ l1 < l2 ≤ s, then αl1 ≤ αl2 .
Proof. By assertion (iii) of Assumption 2, we have dl1,0 ≤ dl2,0, dl1,1 ≤ dl2,1, . . .,
dl1,m ≤ dl2,m. Consequently, from Lemma 1, it follows that
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E[C |C ≤ dl1,0]P[C ≤ dl1,0] + dl1,0
(
q0 − P[C ≤ dl1,0]
)
+ dl1,1q1 + · · ·+ dl1,mqm
≤ E[C |C ≤ dl2,0]P[C ≤ dl2,0] + dl2,0
(
q0 − P[C ≤ dl2,0]
)
+ dl2,1q1 + · · ·+ dl2,mqm.
By (6), we have αl1 ≤ αl2 .
Theorem 1. For existence of a solution to (6), it is necessary that
αl ≤ min
{
1−
1
rl
,
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
}
for all s0 ≤ l ≤ s, (8)
where
f
(
c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m
)
= E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]
q0 + c
∗
1q1 + · · ·+ c
∗
mqm.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the maximum value of the right-hand side of (6) is attained
when dl,0 = c
∗
1, dl,1 = c
∗
1, dl,2 = c
∗
2, . . . , dl,m = c
∗
m and equals to E[C |C ≤
c∗1] q0 + c
∗
1q1 + · · ·+ c
∗
mqm. Therefore, we get
αl ≤
E[C |C ≤ c∗1] q0 + c
∗
1q1 + · · ·+ c
∗
mqm
E[C]
, s0 ≤ l ≤ s. (9)
Since
E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]
q0 + c
∗
1q1 + · · ·+ c
∗
mqm
< E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]
q0 + E
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
q1 + · · ·+ E
[
C |C > c∗m
]
qm
= E[C],
the right-hand side of (9) is less than 1. Thus, combining (9) and the inequality αl ≤
1− 1/rl, which follows immediately from Assumption 1, gives (8).
Lemma 2. Let condition (8) hold. Then for any fixed l such that s0 ≤ l ≤ s, we can
always choose dl,0, dl,1, . . . , dl,m satisfying assertions (i) and (ii) of Assumption 2
such that (6) is true.
The assertion of the lemma is evident.
Remark 1. Note only that if
min
{
1−
1
rl
,
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
}
=
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
,
i.e.
αl =
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
,
then the combination is unique: dl,0 = c
∗
1, dl,1 = c
∗
1, dl,2 = c
∗
2, . . ., dl,m = c
∗
m.
Otherwise, if
αl <
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
,
then there are infinitely many such combinations.
Next, note that by Lemma 2, we can choose dl,0, dl,1, . . ., dl,m for any fixed l,
but assertion (iii) of Assumption 2 may not hold.
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The next theorem shows that we can always replace the bonus–malus system
described in Section 2 by the bonus–malus system with varying deductibles.
Theorem 2. There is always a solution to (6), i.e. a combination of αl, dl,0, dl,1, . . . ,
dl,m, where s0 ≤ l ≤ s, such that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Proof. Consider now two cases.
1) If
min
{
1−
1
rs0
,
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
}
=
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
,
let
αs0 =
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
.
By Lemma 2 and Remark 1 applied to l = s0, we get ds0,0 = c
∗
1, ds0,1 = c
∗
1,
ds0,2 = c
∗
2, . . . , ds0,m = c
∗
m. To satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, for all l such that
s0 + 1 ≤ l ≤ s, we set αl = αs0 , dl,0 = ds0,0, dl,1 = ds0,1, . . . , dl,m = ds0,m,
which proves the theorem in the first case.
2) If
min
{
1−
1
rs0
,
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
}
= 1−
1
rs0
,
let
αs0 = 1−
1
rs0
.
By Lemma 2 and Remark 1 applied to l = s0, we can always choose required
ds0,0, ds0,1, . . ., ds0,m and there are infinitely many such combinations. We take any
of them. Finally, to satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, for all l such that s0 + 1 ≤ l ≤ s,
we also set αl = αs0 , dl,0 = ds0,0, dl,1 = ds0,1, . . . , dl,m = ds0,m, which proves the
theorem in the second case.
The considerations given above show that the replacement of the bonus–malus
system described in Section 2 (without deductibles) by the bonus–malus system with
varying deductibles is not unique. So the insurance company can consider different
replacements and choose one that seems to be more attractive from the policyholders’
point of view.
We now consider two special cases. Another one is considered in Section 4.
Example 1. We now suppose that deductibles are applied only to claims of typem,
i.e. dl,i = 0 for all s0 ≤ l ≤ s and 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1. Therefore, (6) can be rewritten as
αlE[C] = dl,mqm. (10)
Taking into account Theorem 1, we take any αs0 such that
0 < αs0 ≤ min
{
1−
1
rs0
,
c∗mqm
E[C]
}
.
By (10), ds0,m = αs0E[C]/qm. To satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, we set αl = αs0
and dl,m = ds0,m for all s0 + 1 ≤ l ≤ s. Thus, we get a simple replacement to the
bonus–malus system.
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Example 2. Let αl = 1− 1/rl for all s0 ≤ l ≤ s. By Theorem 1, if
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
< 1−
1
rs0
,
then (6) has no suitable solution. So the bonus–malus system cannot be replaced in
this way.
4 The case where deductibles are applied only to the claims reported by
policyholders occupying the highest level in the bonus–malus scale
We now consider the special case where dl,i = 0 for all s0 ≤ l ≤ s − 1 and 0 ≤
i ≤ m. This case is of great interest when the premium relativity for policyholders
who are at level s is high enough and varying deductibles are applied to soften the
bonus–malus system for such policyholders. To meet the conditions of Assumption 1,
we require that (1−αs)rs ≥ rs−1, which gives αs ≤ 1− rs−1/rs. So we can choose
any positive αs such that
αs ≤ min
{
1−
rs−1
rs
,
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
m)
E[C]
}
(11)
and then find ds,0, ds,1, . . ., ds,m from equation (6) applied to l = s, i.e. from
αsE[C] = E[C |C ≤ ds,0]P[C ≤ ds,0] + ds,0
(
q0 − P[C ≤ ds,0]
)
+ ds,1q1 + · · ·+ ds,mqm.
(12)
If inequality (11) is strict, then there are infinitely many solutions to (12). We now
consider two allocation principles for the deductibles.
The first principle is when the deductibles are proportional to the average claims
of each type. This principle seems to be natural and fair for policyholders, but that is
not always possible, which is easily seen from the next theorem.
Theorem 3. Let αs be such that inequality (11) is strict and set
x0=min
{
c∗1
E[C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2]
,
c∗2
E[C | c∗2 < C ≤ c
∗
3]
, . . . ,
c∗m
E[C |C > c∗m]
}
. (13)
If
αsE[C] > E
[
C |C ≤ x0 E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]]
P
[
C ≤ x0 E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]]
+ x0
(
E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
] (
q0 − P
[
C ≤ x0 E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]])
+ E
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
q1 + · · ·+ E
[
C |C > c∗m
]
qm
)
, (14)
then we cannot allocate deductibles proportionally to the average claims.
Otherwise, if
αsE[C] ≤ E
[
C |C ≤ x0 E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]]
P
[
C ≤ x0 E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]]
+ x0
(
E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
] (
q0 − P
[
C ≤ x0 E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]])
+ E
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
q1 + · · ·+ E
[
C |C > c∗m
]
qm
)
, (15)
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then that is possible and (12) has a unique solution of such kind expressed by
ds,0 = xE
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]
, ds,1 = xE
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
, . . . ,
ds,m = xE
[
C |C > c∗m
]
,
(16)
where x is a unique positive solution to the equation
αsE[C] = E
[
C |C ≤ xE
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]]
P
[
C ≤ xE
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]]
+ x
(
E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
] (
q0 − P
[
C ≤ xE
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]])
+ E
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
q1 + · · ·+ E
[
C |C > c∗m
]
qm
)
. (17)
Proof. Let x be a proportionality coefficient, i.e. we have (16). To meet the assertion
(i) of Assumption 2, we require that
xE
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]
≤ c∗1, xE
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
≤ c∗1,
xE
[
C | c∗2 < C ≤ c
∗
3
]
≤ c∗2, . . . , xE
[
C |C > c∗m
]
≤ c∗m,
which is equivalent to
x ≤ min
{
c∗1
E[C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2]
,
c∗2
E[C | c∗2 < C ≤ c
∗
3]
, . . . ,
c∗m
E[C |C > c∗m]
}
.
So we suppose that x ∈ [0, x0], where x0 is given by (13), and substitute (16)
into (12), which yields (17).
The left-hand side of (17) is a positive constant. By Lemma 1, the right-hand
side of (17) is an increasing function of x on [0, x0]. By the continuity of FC , it is
continuous in x on [0, x0]. Moreover, this function is equal to 0 as x = 0. Therefore,
if (15) holds, then (17) has a unique solution x ∈ [0, x0]. Otherwise, if (14) is true,
then there is no solution x ∈ [0, x0] to (17), which completes the proof.
Remark 2. Equation (17) is not solvable analytically in the general case. To find x,
we should use numerical methods.
The second principle implies that large claims are penalized by means of de-
ductibles strictly and small claims are not penalized at all (if that is possible) or at
least not so strictly. Anyway (12) must hold. Firstly, we check if it is possible to pe-
nalize only claims of type m. To this end, we set ds,0 = ds,1 = · · · = ds,m−1 = 0,
ds,m = c
∗
m and substitute this into (12). If
αsE[C] ≤ c
∗
mqm,
that is possible and the desired allocation is given by
ds,0 = ds,1 = · · · = ds,m−1 = 0 and ds,m = αsE[C]/qm.
Otherwise, if
αsE[C] > c
∗
mqm,
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we also have to penalize at least claims of type m − 1. We set ds,0 = ds,1 = · · · =
ds,m−2 = 0, ds,m−1 = c
∗
m−1, ds,m = c
∗
m and substitute this into (12). If
αsE[C] ≤ c
∗
m−1qm−1 + c
∗
mqm,
then the desired allocation is given by
ds,0 = ds,1 = · · · = ds,m−2 = 0,
ds,m−1 =
αsE[C]− c
∗
mqm
qm−1
and ds,m = c
∗
m.
Otherwise, we also have to penalize at least claims of type m − 2. So we set ds,0 =
ds,1 = · · · = ds,m−3 = 0, ds,m−2 = c
∗
m−2, ds,m−1 = c
∗
m−1, ds,m = c
∗
m, substitute
this into (12) and continue in this way until we get the desired allocation. Note that
such an allocation is always possible provided that inequality (11) holds.
5 Numerical illustrations
We now consider the scale with 4 levels (numbered from 0 to 3) and 4 claim types
(numbered from 0 to 3 with probabilities q0, q1, q2 and q3). If no claims are reported
during the current year, the policyholder moves one level down. Each claim of type 0
is penalized by one level, each claim of type 1 is penalized by 2 levels, each claim of
type 2 or 3 is penalized by 3 levels. Note that penalties for claims of types 2 and 3 are
different due to varying deductibles. For instance, if 2 claims of type 0 are reported
during the year, then the policyholder moves 2 levels up; if 1 claim of type 0 and 1
claim of type 1 are reported, then the policyholder moves 3 levels up, i.e. goes at the
highest level anyway.
The elements of the one-step transition matrix for a policyholder with annual
mean claim frequency λθ and vector of probabilities q = (q0, q1, q2, q3)
T are calcu-
lated using formula (1). Thus, the one-step transition matrix is given by
P (λθ;q)
=


e−λθ λθq0e
−λθ λθq1e
−λθ+
(λθq0)
2
2 e
−λθ 1−e−λθ−λθ(q0+q1)e
−λθ
−
(λθq0)
2
2 e
−λθ
e−λθ 0 λθq0e
−λθ 1−e−λθ−λθq0e
−λθ
0 e−λθ 0 1−e−λθ
0 0 e−λθ 1−e−λθ

.
Next, the stationary probabilities pil(λθ;q), 0 ≤ l ≤ 3, are calculated using
formula (2). A standard computation shows that
pi0(λθ;q) =
e−3λθ
∆
,
pi1(λθ;q) =
e−2λθ − e−3λθ
∆
,
pi2(λθ;q) =
e−λθ − e−2λθ − λθq0e
−3λθ
∆
,
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pi3(λθ;q) =
1− e−λθ − 2λθq0e
−2λθ + λθ(q0 − q1)e
−3λθ − (λθq0)
2
2 e
−3λθ
∆
,
where
∆ = 1− 2λθq0e
−2λθ − λθq1e
−3λθ −
(λθq0)
2
2
e−3λθ.
It is easily seen that
e−3λθ ≥ 0, e−2λθ − e−3λθ ≥ 0 and e−λθ − e−2λθ − λθq0e
−3λθ ≥ 0
for all λ > 0, θ ≥ 0 and 0 < q0 < 1. Moreover, it is evident that
∑3
l=0 pil(λθ;q) = 1.
So to see that pil(λθ;q), 0 ≤ l ≤ 3, are indeed probabilities, we must show that
1− e−λθ − 2λθq0e
−2λθ + λθ(q0 − q1)e
−3λθ −
(λθq0)
2
2
e−3λθ ≥ 0 (18)
for all λ > 0, θ ≥ 0, q0 > 0 and q1 > 0 such that q0 + q1 < 1.
It is easy to check that the minimum value of the left-hand side of (18) with
respect to q0 ≥ 0 and q1 ≥ 0 such that q0 + q1 ≤ 1 is attained as q0 = 1, q1 = 0 and
equal to
1− e−λθ − 2λθe−2λθ + λθe−3λθ −
(λθ)2
2
e−3λθ. (19)
Introduce the function
h(y) = 1− e−y − 2ye−2y + ye−3y −
y2
2
e−3y, y ≥ 0.
Taking the derivative yields
h′(y) = e−3y
(
ey − 1
)2
+ 2y
(
2e−2y − e−3y
)
+
3y2
2
e−3y ≥ 0, y ≥ 0.
Therefore, h(y) is non-decreasing and its minimum value is attained as y = 0
and equals to 0. Consequently, the minimum value of (19) is also 0 as λθ = 0, which
gives (18).
In this section, we deal with exponentially distributed claim sizes with mean µ >
0, i.e. the distribution function FC of C is equal to FC(y) = 1− e
−y/µ, y ≥ 0. Thus,
we have
q0 = 1− e
−c∗1/µ, q1 = e
−c∗1/µ − e−c
∗
2/µ,
q2 = e
−c∗2/µ − e−c
∗
3/µ, q3 = 1− e
−c∗3/µ;
E
[
C |C ≤ c∗1
]
=
1
q0
∫ c∗1
0
y
µ
e−y/µ dy =
µ(1 − e−c
∗
1/µ)− c∗1e
−c∗1/µ
1− e−c
∗
1/µ
= µ−
c∗1e
−c∗1/µ
1− e−c
∗
1/µ
,
E
[
C | c∗1 < C ≤ c
∗
2
]
=
1
q1
∫ c∗2
c∗1
y
µ
e−y/µ dy =
(c∗1 + µ)e
−c∗1/µ − (c∗2 + µ)e
−c∗2/µ
e−c
∗
1/µ − e−c
∗
2/µ
= µ+
c∗1e
−c∗1/µ − c∗2e
−c∗2/µ
e−c
∗
1/µ − e−c
∗
2/µ
,
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E
[
C | c∗2 < C ≤ c
∗
3
]
=
1
q2
∫ c∗3
c∗2
y
µ
e−y/µ dy =
(c∗2 + µ)e
−c∗2/µ − (c∗3 + µ)e
−c∗3/µ
e−c
∗
2/µ − e−c
∗
3/µ
= µ+
c∗2e
−c∗2/µ − c∗3e
−c∗3/µ
e−c
∗
2/µ − e−c
∗
3/µ
,
E
[
C |C > c∗3
]
=
1
q3
∫ +∞
c∗3
y
µ
e−y/µ dy =
(c∗3 + µ)e
−c∗3/µ
e−c
∗
3/µ
= µ+ c∗3;
f
(
c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3
)
= µ− µe−c
∗
1/µ − c∗1e
−c∗1/µ + c∗1
(
e−c
∗
1/µ − e−c
∗
2/µ
)
+ c∗2
(
e−c
∗
2/µ − e−c
∗
3/µ
)
+ c∗3e
−c∗3/µ
= µ− µe−c
∗
1/µ +
(
c∗2 − c
∗
1
)
e−c
∗
2/µ +
(
c∗3 − c
∗
2
)
e−c
∗
3/µ.
In addition, we suppose that FΘ(θ) = 1− e
−θ, θ ≥ 0.
Example 3. Let λ = 0.1, µ = 2, c∗1 = 1, c
∗
2 = 2, c
∗
3 = 4. Then we have q0 ≈ 0.3935,
q1 ≈ 0.2387, q2 ≈ 0.2325, q3 ≈ 0.1353. The corresponding values of pil and rl,
0 ≤ l ≤ 3, are calculated using formulas (3) and (4), respectively, and are given in
Tables 1–9.
We first consider the case when deductibles are applied only to the claims reported
by policyholders occupying the highest level in the bonus–malus system. By (11), we
have
α3 ≤ min
{
1−
r2
r3
,
f(c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3)
µ
}
≈
{
1−
1.8899
2.1844
,
1.425489
2
}
≈ min{0.1348, 0.7127}= 0.1348.
By (13), we get x0 = 0.6667. Taking α3 = 0.05 and α3 = 0.13 shows that (15)
is true in both cases. Hence, we can allocate deductibles proportionally to the average
Table 1. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied only to claims reported by policyholders occupying the highest level, α3 = 0.05 and
the first principle is used
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1− αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.05 0.4150 0.0230 0.0730 0.1420 0.3004
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0 0.3780 0 0 0 0
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0 0.3309 0 0 0 0
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 2. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied only to claims reported by policyholders occupying the highest level, α3 = 0.13 and
the first principle is used
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1− αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.13 0.3801 0.0598 0.1903 0.3699 0.7827
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0 0.3780 0 0 0 0
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0 0.3309 0 0 0 0
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
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Table 3. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied only to claims reported by policyholders occupying the highest level, α3 = 0.05 and
the second principle is used
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.05 0.4150 0 0 0 0.7389
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0 0.3780 0 0 0 0
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0 0.3309 0 0 0 0
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 4. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied only to claims reported by policyholders occupying the highest level, α3 = 0.13 and
the second principle is used
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.05 0.3801 0 0 0 1.9212
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0 0.3780 0 0 0 0
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0 0.3309 0 0 0 0
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 5. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied only to claims of type 3
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.24 0.3320 0 0 0 3.5467
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0.13 0.3288 0 0 0 1.9212
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0.06 0.3110 0 0 0 0.8867
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 6. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied only to claims of type 3. Larger values of αl
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.26 0.3233 0 0 0 3.8423
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0.25 0.2835 0 0 0 3.6945
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0.24 0.2514 0 0 0 3.5467
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
claims. By (17), the proportionality coefficient x = 0.050066 if α3 = 0.05 and
x = 0.130443 if α3 = 0.13. The corresponding values of deductibles are calculated
using (16) and given in Tables 1 and 2.
If we apply the second principle considered in Section 4, we get α3µ ≤ c
∗
3q3 for
both values of α3. The desired allocation is presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Tables 5 and 6 give examples of bonus–malus system in the case where de-
ductibles are applied only to claims of type 3. In Table 6, we take larger values of
αl, so we get higher values of the deductibles.
If we also apply deductibles to claims of type 2 for the same values of αl, the
values of deductibles dl,3 are not so high (see Table 7). Moreover, in this case, we can
take larger values of αl such that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold (see Table 8).
Table 9 presents an example of bonus–malus system in the case where deductibles
are applied to claims of types 1, 2 and 3. On the one hand, policyholderswho are in the
Bonus–malus systems with different claim types and varying deductibles 157
Table 7. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied to claims of types 2 and 3
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.26 0.3233 0 0 1.1 1.9522
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0.25 0.2835 0 0 1.1 1.8044
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0.24 0.2514 0 0 1.1 1.6566
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 8. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied to claims of types 2 and 3. Larger values of αl
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.45 0.2403 0 0 1.7 3.7291
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0.40 0.2268 0 0 1.6 3.1620
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0.35 0.2151 0 0 1.5 2.5949
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 9. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 3 where deductibles are
applied to claims of types 1, 2 and 3
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1 − αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0508 2.1844 0.4369 0.45 0.2403 0 0.7 1.5 2.8383
2 0.0591 1.8899 0.3780 0.40 0.2268 0 0.5 1.4 2.6239
1 0.0716 1.6543 0.3309 0.35 0.2151 0 0.3 1.3 2.4096
0 0.8185 0.8050 0.1610 0 0.1610 0 0 0 0
Table 10. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 4 where deductibles are
applied to claims of types 2 and 3
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1− αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0653 2.0731 0.4146 0.20 0.3317 0 0 0.30 1.2544
2 0.0717 1.7925 0.3585 0.15 0.3047 0 0 0.25 0.9102
1 0.0679 1.6263 0.3253 0.10 0.2927 0 0 0.20 0.5659
0 0.7951 0.7869 0.1574 0 0.1574 0 0 0 0
Table 11. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 4 where deductibles are
applied to claims of types 1, 2 and 3
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1− αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0653 2.0731 0.4146 0.24 0.3151 0 0.10 0.60 1.0847
2 0.0717 1.7925 0.3585 0.22 0.2796 0 0.10 0.55 0.9838
1 0.0679 1.6263 0.3253 0.20 0.2602 0 0.05 0.50 0.9461
0 0.7951 0.7869 0.1574 0 0.1574 0 0 0 0
malus zone pay not such high premiums. On the other hand, the corresponding values
of deductibles are moderate. This bonus–malus system seems to be more attractive.
Example 4. Let λ = 0.1, µ = 2, c∗1 = 0.3, c
∗
2 = 1.2, c
∗
3 = 2.8. Then we have
q0 ≈ 0.1393, q1 ≈ 0.3119, q2 ≈ 0.3022, q3 ≈ 0.2466. The corresponding values of
pil and rl as well as examples of bonus–malus systems with varying deductibles are
given in Tables 10–12.
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Table 12. Bonus–malus system with varying deductibles for Example 4 where deductibles are
applied to claims of types 1, 2 and 3. Larger values of αl
l pil rl λrlE[C] αl (1− αl)λrlE[C] dl,0 dl,1 dl,2 dl,3
3 0.0653 2.0731 0.4146 0.45 0.2280 0 0.20 0.9 2.2937
2 0.0717 1.7925 0.3585 0.40 0.2151 0 0.15 0.8 2.0740
1 0.0679 1.6263 0.3253 0.35 0.2114 0 0.10 0.7 1.8543
0 0.7951 0.7869 0.1574 0 0.1574 0 0 0 0
6 Conclusion
The bonus–malus systems with different claim types and varying deductibles elimi-
nate both drawbacks of the traditional bonus–malus systems mentioned in Section 1
and present a number of advantages, namely:
• Policyholders reporting small and large claims are not penalized in the same
way. This helps to avoid or at least decrease bonus hunger.
• Policyholders will do all their best to prevent or at least decrease the losses.
• Even if a policyholder leaves the company after a claim, he has to pay for the
deductible.
• Relative premiums and amounts of deductibles may be tuned in an optimal way
in order to attract policyholders.
Section 5 gives a few examples of such bonus–malus systems. The numerical
illustrations show that use of both penalty types (premium relativities and varying
deductibles) in this way seems indeed attractive and fair for policyholders. On the
one hand, policyholders who are in the malus zone pay not such high premiums. On
the other hand, the corresponding values of deductibles are moderate. In addition, it
is fair that only policyholders reporting (large) claims are subject to further penalties,
i.e. deductibles.
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